21 March 1985

NOTE FOR DCI

SUBJECT: NSPG on Afghanistan




- 1. An NSPG has been scheduled for 1100 Tuesday, 26 March, to review US policy, programs and strategy vis-a-vis Afghanistan. (A draft NSDD on this subject has been circulated among PCG members; that will be the subject of NSPG discussion). Also on Tuesday, at 1500, an NFIB is scheduled to consider five estimates, two of which deal with Afghanistan:
 - -- "Soviet Problems, Prospects, and Options in Afghanistan in 1985" (Ermarth).
 - -- "The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan: Implications for the Regional Powers and the US" (Fuller).
- 2. I called the NSC this morning to advise them of the estimates being considered at Tuesday's NFIB after the NSPG had already met (this to make sure they didn't want to have the NSPG after the NFIB estimates had been approved). I was advised that "Bud wanted to have the meeting on Tuesday" and "that the PCG had received briefings on the subjects of the estimates".
- 3. Today there were final coordinating sessions on both estimates. Drafts are being sent out for final coordination late today/early tomorrow.

 Attached you will find current versions of the Key Judgments 	tor
both papers (in the case of the Ermarth SNIE, the body of this reporwill be put out as an IIM).	

cc: DDCI

25X1

SECRET



Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2009/12/1	1 : CIA-RDP87B00342R000200280001-5
se(RFT

25X1

Memo for the DCI and the DDCI

From: F. Ermarth

Subject: SNIE on Soviet Near-term Prospects in Afghanistan

In consultation with Bob and Herb, we've decided to go with a slightly beefed up version of the key judgments of this estimate as the SNIE (attached). We shall use the main body of the report you have already seen as the analytic base for coordinating the short SNIE, and proceed to coordinate the main paper for issuance as an IIM.

This approach will a) speed the process to mesh with the planned NSPG on 26 March -- although NFIB is scheduled to approve the SNIE that day, we can get a coordinated draft to the NSC earlier, b) put a very short paper with all the bottom lines before consumers, while c) also producing a very good assessment of the current state and near-future outlook of the war.

Unless I hear otherwise from you before Monday, we'll proceed on this basis.

FYI: From the start of this exercise, I've received excellent support background necessary to support judgments about near-future Mujahedin effectiveness. Also, I've vetted the language we shall use in the text (see page 6 of the attached).

25X1

25X1

